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Before World War II, the British and Americans had been fierce rivals in the
international airline business. Their wartime alliance muted this rivalry, yet it
still simmered, manifesting itselfin a variety ofglobal incidents and issues. As
the war progressed, the Americans gained tremendous advantages in thefield,
raising British fears about American dominance of the world’s airways. In
turn, American policymakers worried about British control ofkey areas of the
world. The mutual suspicion grew, and the rivalry resurfaced in the last
months of the war. The conflict had merely subsumed the differences, and
made the two powers rivals ofa kind.
The Anglo-American “special relationship” of World War II has an almost mythical
status. Anecdotes abound about British and American cooperation in winning the war. A
notable example involves the development of the legendary P-5 1 Mustang fighter. The
British combined the American design with the superlative Rolls-Royce Merlin engine,
producing a dramatic improvement in performance which, along with other
modifications, made the Mustang a scourge of the Nazis.’
While a special relationship indeed existed, historians have developed a more nuanced
view of the matter. In his work Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain, and the War
Against Japan, 1941-1945, Christopher Thorne acknowledges that the Anglo-American
wartime relationship was a “remarkable achievement.” Yet he also notes that the British
and Americans had disagreements which strained their relationship. This was especially
true in the commercial realm, where they historically were rivals. In his words, at times
they were in fact “only allies of a lcind’ 2
Thorne’s phrase subtly exposes the limits of Anglo-American cooperation. While his
focus is on East Asia, his statement is quite applicable to the field of international 1 03
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the industry. Yet the necessities of war muted this rivaLry as the two powers came together
to battle the Axis. Still, the rivalry simmered, manifesting itself in a variety of global
incidents and issues. As the war progressed, these incidents and issues increased in number
and significance, with both sides preparing to resume the rivalry. At the same time, the
Americans forged tremendous advantages in the development, production and operation
of transport aircraft. This disparity raised British fears about American dominance of the
world’s airways. In turn, the British controlled key landing sites and air routes around the
world, making American policymakers wary about British aviation activities. The mutual
suspicion grew, and the rivalry resurfaced in the last months of the war.
This paper echoes Thorne’s qualification of the “special relationship:’ However, its
approach to the subject is different in that it focuses on the commercial aviation rivalry
between the two powers which existed before the war and persisted through it. In essence,
instead of a qualified alliance, it portrays the wartime relationship as a qualified rivalry
limited by the contingencies of war. This is a complex story of commercial interest,
diplomatic intrigue, and dynamic circumstances which complicated the Anglo-American
relationship and shaped post-war global aviation.
The interwar period was a “golden age” for international airlines. Technological and
operational advances resulted in the development of vast air networks, At the same time,
these commercial endeavors had an aura of romance; the air was a new frontier, and
international airlines served as pioneers. The new air routes brought exotic locales closer
to home for many, and international flights became the subject of dreams. In sum,
international airlines were growing, progressive, and prestigious instruments. 3
Two of the leading international airlines of the period were the United States’ Pan
American Airways and Great Britain’s Imperial Airways. Pan American Airways was the
creation of Juan Trippe, an entrepreneur with ties to both Wall Street and Washington.
Beginning in 1927, he developed an enterprise which had covered Latin America by the
early 1930s. By 1939, he had crossed both the Atlantic and Pacific. His efforts made Pan
American a profitable enterprise. He found a willing partner for this venture in the U.S.
government, which designated Pan American as its “chosen instrument” in international
airlines, subsidizing it with airmail contracts and lending it diplomatic assistance. In
return, Pan American expedited communication for business and diplomacy, deterring
foreign competition in areas of U.S. strategic interest. 4
The origins of Imperial Airways were notably different. The British government
established the enterprise in 1924; while the airline offered shares for public purchase, the
government appointed its administrators, oversaw its operations, and directly subsidized
it. In sum, Imperial was a government venture with private stockholders. The government’s
primary interest was to improve imperial communications. Thus, Imperial focused its
efforts on developing services in the Mediterranean, Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and
Australia. By 1939, it had developed a route system comparable to that of Pan American.
Pan American and Imperial shared the distinctions ofbeing pioneers in their field, and
ofbeing “chosen instruments:’ Yet they differed greatly. Pan American built its foundation
in Latin America with little difficulty due to the tremendous U.S. influence in the region.
D4 Imperial had the more arduous task of negotiating with European neighbor for air and
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British Empire. As a “chosen instrument:’ Imperial was a government operation. Pan
American, on the other hand, was an independent enterprise; while the U.S. government
aided greatly in its development, it never exercised control over the airline’s operations.
Thus, Pan American could pursue routes with commercial promise. Imperial, meanwhile,
had to meet the political directive of improving imperial communications, regardless of
commercial considerations. Furthermore, the government mandated a “buy British”
policy which limited its aircraft purchasing options. Pan American, facing no such
restrictions, was able to thrive upon a competitive American aircraft industry. As a result
of these factors, Pan American became a relatively successful commercial venture, while
Imperial’s government subsidies increased thirteenfold between 1924 and 1939.6
The expansion ofthe two airlines eventually led to a rivalry. The initial clash took place
in the mid-i930s, when Trippe tried to start a lucrative trans-Atlantic service. The British,
who controlled the key landing sites of Ireland, Newfoundland, and Bermuda, blocked his
way. They were not ready to match such a service, and were not about to let the Americans
get a jump on them.
Thus denied, Trippe sought to establish a trans-Pacific route to the long-fabled market
of China. He wanted to proceed via Hong Kong, but the British once again stood in his
way. To circumvent them, Trippe obtained landing rights at the Portuguese colony of
Macao. He used this arrangement to frighten Hong Kong’s business leaders, who worried
that it would undermine their commercial preeminence in the region. They pressed the
British to let Pan American into Hong Kong. The British had no choice but to grant the
landing rights, as Imperial was unable to match Pan American’s service.
Trippe repeated this maneuver in the South Pacific. The British, for their part, wanted
to establish a trans-Pacific route between Australia and Canada. The two sides were sure
to clash since they would require the same South Pacific islands for air bases. To further
complicate matters, many of these islands were subject to conflicting Anglo-American
claims. Soon, the two sides were in a “race” to occupy various island chains. The
Americans beat the British to the proverbial punch, and while diplomats haggled over
maps, claims, and slights, Trippe built his airfields. While hardly happy with this, the
British did think that the Americans would have to accommodate them, since Pan
American needed landing rights in New Zealand or Australia. Yet Imperial did not serve
New Zealand, and concerns arose there that Britain would be content to land in Australia,
leaving New Zealand out of the international loop. Trippe played upon this fear. He struck
a deal with the French in late 1938 that gave Pan American access to New Caledonia, an
island just north of Australia. Pan American announced that it would fly to the French
colony, and then transport its passengers to Australia by boat. This both negated Britain’s
threat to bar Pan American from Australia and prompted New Zealand to offer the airline
landing rights without any expectation of reciprocal landing rights.
The final battle took place in the north Atlantic. With the introduction of the Boeing
314 in early 1939, Trippe resumed his quest for a trans-Atlantic service. The British again
tried to stall Pan American, but the Boeings, with their great range, could reach Europe
without stopping at British-controlled landing sites in the Atlantic. In January 1939,
Trippe obtained French permission to operate to Marseilles; he had his trans-Atlantic 1 05
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established rivalry.
World War II would interrupt the contest. It disrupted the services of Imperial and its
successor, the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC). 5 The British diverted many
of their commercial aviation resources to the war effort, dedicating their aircraft
manufacturing industry to combat aircraft. Coupled with attrition resulting from natural
wear-and-tear and enemy action, this severely limited the number of aircraft BOAC had.
Various battlefield developments cut many routes to the empire. BOAC maintained what
services it could, but these were committed to the war effort and did little to promote the
airline’s commercial fortunes. As the war years passed, the British found themselves falling
further behind the Americans in the development and production of airliners, as well as
in airline operations as a whole. As the gap widened, the British struggled to challenge the
Americans, or even keep them out of their empire. 9
By 1941, the British were in desperate straits. War raged in the Mediterranean,
threatening their supply routes to the Middle East. In desperate need ofanother lifeline to
that front, they sought to establish an air service across West Africa that would reach the
Middle East via East Africa. Their efforts had little success. During the interwar period,
Imperial had focused on strengthening imperial ties with the leading dominions and
colonies. As a result, West Africa had been a low priority Now in the midst of a war, BOAC
was straining to maintain its existing services, and could do little to start a new one in
West Africa. 10
There was one company that could do the job: Pan American. In a spring meeting
during 1941 with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Trippe offered to have Pan
American develop an air network in West Africa. The idea of having an American
company meet British military needs in a British sphere of influence must have galled the
stridently imperialist Churchill. Many others in the British government argued against any
such arrangement, as they feared it would give the Americans carte blanche in the empire.
Still, no other alternative presented itself. The British yielded to the necessities of war and
signed a contract with Pan American. Soon, Trippe’s company was building bases,
establishing routes, and planning operations. Late in the year, it began ferrying equipment
and supplies to Egypt via West Africa.”
This arrangement made quite evident the British predicament with regard to
commercial aviation. Not only were they unable to compete with Pan American, but they
had to depend upon it for vital wartime services. To make matters worse, the need to
dedicate manufacturing resources to combat aircraft not only forced the British to
suspend transport aircraft development and production, but also compelled them to
abandon their “buy British” policy ofthe interwar years and purchase American airplanes.
This stagnation oftheir own industry, coupled with dependence on the Americans, could
only help their commercial rivals.’ 2
When the United States entered the war, the two allies were able to formalize working
arrangements that had existed before Pearl Harboic The result was a level of cooperation
unmatched in history; they did just about everything together. Aviation was no exception.
In early 1942, the two allies agreed to pool their aviation resources and divide their
)6 responsibilities. The “Lyttleton Agreement:’ as it was called, allowed the British to focus
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transport aircraft.’ 3 In fact, this simply made official the existing state of affairs.
The arrangement worked quite well for the war effort, as the Americans provided the
British with thousands of aircraft for battlefield and supply operations. American C-47s
carried British paratroopers on various wartime missions. Transport versions of the
Liberator bomber ferried British pilots across the Atlantic. Boeing 3 14s allowed BOAC to
fly priority passengers (most notably Winston Churchill) on diplomatic missions. This
was in addition to the American services which aided the war effort.’ 4 In all, the British
benefited greatly from American air operations.
Yet the arrangement also increased the gap between the British and Americans in
commercial aviation. This gap manifested itself in three ways. One manifestation was in
transport aircraft production. Between July 1940 and September 1944, American
companies produced over 17,000 transport aircraft. While the British received 1,400 of
these under the Lend-Lease program, the vast majority went to the U.S. military transport
commands and the American airlines engaged in the war effort. While the war certainly
limited the number of new aircraft available to American airlines, they did get some. Once
the war ended, they could anticipate buying many more at bargain prices from the U.S.
military. British airlines, on the other hand, could hardly expect the Americans to be
generous with their aircraft after the war, and their manufacturers were producing
virtually no transport aircraft.
The second manifestation was in research and development, which the war also
stimulated in the United States. Such transport designs as the Douglas DC-4 and the
Lockheed Constellation showcased significant technical advances. The latter, for example,
could carry up to fifty-four passengers, and had a maximum speed of 310 miles per hour
and a maximum range ofalmost 3,000 miles. More significantly, its cabin was pressurized,
which made it more comfortable and economical.’ 6 The British simply could not keep
pace with such developments during the war.
The third manifestation was in operational experience. Between 1939 and 1945, BOAC
flew 65 million miles and carried 325,000 passengers. As impressive as this record was,
however, it did not match the sheer size of the American effort. Pan American alone flew
15,000 trans-oceanic missions during the war. It also operated in Latin America, Africa,
and Asia. In total, it logged over 1.3 billion passenger miles between 1939 and 1945. Other
American airlines supplemented the effort. Transcontinental and Western Air (TWA)
made 5,000 trans-Atlantic flights between 1942 and 1945, carrying 112,000 passengers and
20 million pounds of cargo. United Airlines flew 21 million miles, and carried 40 million
pounds of cargo. In all, American airlines totaled 3 billion passenger miles during the
period between 1942 and 1945.’
It was evident early on that the Americans would hold a tremendous advantage over
the British in future commercial airline operations. The British were well aware that they
trailed in the design of transport aircraft, and were alarmed by the sheer number of
American-operated aircraft flying in the British spheres of influence. As a result, they
became sensitive about the activities of American aviation interests in their domains. In
April 1942, A.K. Helm of the British Embassy in Washington met with U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Adolf Berle. Helm informed Berle that the British had received reports 1 07
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that the British expected the Americans to consult them before any such move took place.
Berle acknowledged that he had heard similar reports, but assured the British
representative that the initiative did not have the U.S. government’s blessing. Yet he also
told Helm that this did not mean that the United States would accept the exclusion of
American airlines from the region after the war, or that it would consider it necessary for
the British to approve such services. When Helm asked him what the U.S. stance was
toward “exclusive arrangements” between governments for international airlines, Berle
replied that they were unacceptable. The assistant secretary later noted in a report that he
had “an uneasy suspicion that the British may have contemplated such an arrangement
with Egypt.” 8 In an effort to forestall any “exclusive arrangements:’ the State Department
suggested to the British that the two sides agree not to exclude the airlines of each other
from any region through diplomatic means. The British acquiesced in July, with the
exchange of notes becoming known as the “Halifax Agreement.” In essence, the two sides
were to refrain from trying to get a “jump” on each other in the international airline field.’ 9
Despite the agreement, diplomatic squabbling soon broke out. In October, Berle wrote
to Lord Halifax, the British ambassador to the United States, regarding a pact the British
had made with the Ethiopian government the previous January. Berle noted that under its
terms, no airline besides BOAC could operate “in, to, or over” Ethiopia without the
consent of the British government. Citing the Halifax Agreement, Berle informed the
ambassador that the United States expected that the British would not oppose any U.S.
airline interests in Ethiopia. In a reply addressed to the U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull, Halifax assured the Americans that the British would not contest any U.S. services
“across” Ethiopia. A suspicious Berle sent a note to the ambassador which declared, “I
assume the word ‘across’ covers the three cases [“in, to, or over”] cited in the Anglo-
Ethiopian deal.” R.I. Campbell, a subordinate of Halifax, wrote back to Berle that the use
of the word “across” had been a typographical error, and that the British had not intended
to exclude any of the three cases. 20 It is unlikely that Berle accepted this explanation at
face value.
The diplomatic skirmishing soon spread to the West African nation of Liberia, where
both Pan American and the U.S. military had established air bases. In 1942, the Americans
granted British requests to refuel combat aircraft and operate radio facilities at these bases.
However, when the British subsequently suggested that BOAC use these bases for
stopovers on its Freetown-Takoradi supply route, U.S. officials balked. The U.S. charge de
affaires in Liberia, Frederick Hibbard, warned that the service in question “appears to be
of a commercial character:’ and that the British were planning to construct facilities at
these bases that were “all out ofproportion to their needsT 2 ’ A State Department official
told Berle that the British were “obviously desirous of making Liberian territory a base for
BOAC commercial Operations?’ 22
The British, on the other hand, argued that their request was quite justified. They
claimed that the stopover would allow aircraft to haul greater payloads on the Freetown
Takoradi flights, which, they asserted, were vital to the war effort. They emphasized that
they were using “obsolescent” aircraft which could hardly carry a worthwhile payload
08 without the stopover. U.S. officials remained unconvinced. One noted that the Freetown
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pointed out that the British had bases within one hundred miles of Liberia. 23
The debate between the two allies became heated. In a January 1943 meeting with
Berle, Campbell declared that the “Liberian incident” was “making trouble” and might
jeopardize British approval for U.S. Army Transport Command operations in Africa. Berle
would grumble that Campbell “avoided the use of the obvious word ‘reprisaL” 24
Eventually, BOAC got access to Liberia, but only after the British brought up the matter at
the Casablanca Conference. General George Marshall, without full knowledge of the
diplomatic haggling taking place, issued orders allowing BOAC to operate in Liberia. 25
This did not settle the matter, however. U.S. officials soon charged the British with
misusing their newlanding rights. In April, Berle informed the British that he had received
reports that BOAC was transporting civilians through Liberia. He stated that this “did not
conform to our understanding of military use.” 26 The Americans complained through
other channels that BOAC was providing space for civilian traffic while leaving the
military traffic to the U.S. Army Transport Command. The British finally replied to Berle
in July. They explained that they designated BOAC to carry “official:’ not just military,
traffic. As a result, in certain instances civilians were given priority over military traffic.
They emphasized, however, that BOAC was committed to the war effort and would meet
“official demands” before offering any commercial services. 27
This skirmishing was indicative of the conflict that was brewing over the future of
international airlines. Even though the war was far from over, the two allies were focusing
much oftheir energy on planning for the postwar world. With the wartime technical and
operational advances in transport aviation, both sides were becoming increasingly aware
of the important role that international airlines would play in the future. From their
differing perspectives, the two allies developed very different blueprints for the future of
international airlines.
The British were at a grave disadvantage, and they knew it. In a debate in the House of
Lords in early 1943, members criticized the government for lacking a “definite policy” for
commercial aviation. Noting that the Americans were developing their commercial
aviation with “phenomenal rapidity’ Lord Londonderry warned that Britain must act or
risk becoming a “second-class powerT 28 British business groups echoed this concern. The
British Chamber of Commerce lamented that the current state of affairs would produce
an “unhappy result” unless the government took action. 29 A New York Times
correspondent cited the technological achievements and staggering production of the
American aircraft industry as the key causes for British fears about the future of
international airlines. 30
The British government was well aware of the situation, and in fact had taken steps to
address it. In December 1942 it had created a committee, headed by Lord Brabazon, to
develop plans for future civil aircraft. The committee filed a report the following February.
To fill the immediate need for transport aircraft, it suggested that various bomber designs
be converted for civil use. 31 Yet such conversions were merely stopgap measures. The
committee therefore urged that work begin on five new transport designs. The foremost
would be the “Brabazon U’ which bore the designation “London-New York ExpressT
giving a clear indication of its purpose. It would carry fifty passengers at a speed of 275 1 09
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proceed on the conversions and new designs, with the aim being aircraft production “on
a scale and quality in keeping with our world position.” However, the Cabinet specified
that the work must be kept secret, and must not hamper the war effort. 33
The British realized that these efforts would not close the immediate gap between
them and the Americans. The bomber conversions could not match such aircraft as the
Constellation, and the more modern designs were years away from service. Thus, the
British had to neutralize the American edge in commercial aviation with diplomatic
prowess. They had one factor in their favor: their empire. It covered much of the globe and
thus most international air services would cross over and land in British-controlled
territory. The British hoped this advantage wouLd allow them negotiate a favorable
arrangement with the Americans. Specifically, they wanted an international airline
authority that would regulate the frequency of services, the standards of accommodation,
and the fares on international routes. This would limit the services of American airlines
and force them to charge rates comparable to BOAC, thereby allowing the British to
compete until they could close the current technological and operational gap. 34
The challenge for the British was to get the Americans to agree to these terms. The U.S.
perspective on the matter was far different. Officials in Washington knew they held
tremendous advantages in the field; their challenge was to maximize these in the post-war
world. The U.S. aviation industry was the world leader in transport aircraft design and
productive capacity. Quite simply, it could build the best airplanes and a lot of them.
Moreover, the nation held huge capital reserves. In an open contest, American aircraft and
investors were likely to dominate the world’s air routes. As chairman of the government’s
Interdepartmental Committee on International Aviation, Berle had taken the lead role in
formulating U.S. aviation policy. He realized the benefits of a less restrictive international
system for U.S. aviation interests, and thus developed the “open skies” policy. Under its
provisions, there would be no exclusive spheres of influence in international aviation. The
duly designated airlines of any nation would be free to operate anywhere on the globe. 35
Clearly, this contravened the British vision for the field.
Throughout 1943 and 1944, the two allies continued to bicker. The British remained
sensitive to American inroads into their sphere. When the Egyptian government asked the
U.S. War Department for two transport airplanes in April 1943, the British promptly
informed the State Department that all requests for “warlike stores” would have to be
processed through the British military mission in Cairo. They clearly did not want to be
bypassed. The State Department, however, determined that the aircraft would be used for
commercial purposes, and told the British that it would deal directly with the Egyptians. 36
For their part, the Americans monitored British moves closely, suspicious that their
allies continually were trying to pull a “fast one” on them. In June 1944, the State
Department received a report that the British were planning to build a commercial airbase
near Cairo. It promptly informed the British that the U.S. government expected that
American airlines would have access to any such base. 37 BOAC operations were another
matter of concern. U.S. officials continued to claim that the airline engaged in commercial
operations under military guises. For example, when in mid-1944 the British asked the
1 0 State Department to permit BOAC to operate American flying boats on a London-South
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munitions to the Far East across the widest part of the Pacific:’ He was convinced that this
proposal was “the first major move for expansion of commercial air services since the
beginning of the war?’ 38 In effect, he was accusing the British of breaking the Halifax
Agreement.
However, he did not reject the request out ofhand. Instead, he suggested a quidpro quo
to the British. Ifthey would allow the U.S. Army Transport Command to “commercialize”
its Mediterranean operations and permit American airlines to obtain landing rights in
that region,the U.S. government would accede to a SouthAmerican route for BOAC. Berle
was proposing, in essence, that the two allies begin an orderly “move out” into the world’s
air routes. The offer stunned and dismayed the British. It would force BOAC to compete
with American airlines in what had been a British preserve. As one Foreign Office official
noted, the outlook would not be promising in light of the disparity between British and
American aviation resources. Faced with this stark reality, the British withdrew the request
and dropped the matter. 39
Berle’s initiative raised more significant concerns for the British. Their aviation plans
hinged on an international conference and the formation of an international authority.
Berle threatened to discard such ideas and initiate open competition. At a War Cabinet
meeting late in the summer of 1944, Lord Beaverbrook, who was heading British aviation
policy development, warned that the Americans were building thousands of transport
aircraft and that several American airlines were applying for international operating
licenses. If a “move out” took place, he declared, the British had “no alternative to our
going forward with the development of air lines ofour own?’ 40 This was hardly the course
of action Britain wished to pursue, considering its technological and financial
disadvantages. Moreover, the British government had publicly endorsed a conference, and
did not wish to lose face both at home and abroad. The Cabinet decided to inform the
Americans that if they could not call a conference, the British would. The implicit threat
worked. The Americans did not want to permit the British to take the lead in international
aviation policy. Moreover, they realized that they needed to reach a working agreement
with their counterparts in order to secure operating rights in many parts of the world.
Thus, within days, the Americans announced that they would host an international
aviation conference during November in Chicago. 4 ’
Fifty-two nations came to the conference, but two dominated it. The soon-to-be-
devastated Axis powers were absent, of course. A weakened France, a conquered
Netherlands, and a divided Nationalist China held little sway. The Soviets did not even
attend, despite U.S. efforts to involve them. The other attendees simply did not have the
resources or influence to affect the course of events. Thus, it would be Great Britain and
the United States who determined the outcome of the conference. On the American side,
Franklin Roosevelt appointed Berle to chair the U.S. delegation and the entire conference.
He would be in a powerful position to set the agenda and shape the results. His aim was
to convince the attendees to adopt his “open skies” plan by means of a multilateral
convention. 42 U.S. intentions for the conference seemed clear.
On the British side, the government appointed Lord Swinton as its new Under
Secretary of State for Air, and he headed the delegation to Chicago. 43 Swinton was an 111
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certain to oppose the “open skies” plan. His government backed this stance, and issued a
White Paper in October declaring that the British would support four of the “five
freedoms” outlined in the U.S. plan: the rights of transit, technical stop, carrying cargo and
passengers to foreign stops, and carrying cargo and passengers from foreign stops.
However, international regulations and restrictions (i.e. traffic quotas) would apply to
these freedoms. As for the “fifth freedom:’ the right to carry passengers to and from
intermediate stops, this “would be a matter for negotiation.” The British clearly wanted an
arrangement that would control American airlines. 44
When the conference opened, a clash of personalities between Berle and Swinton
amplified the policy disputes. Despite strenuous negotiations, the conference stalled over
the matter of the “fifth freedom:’ This provision would have allowed, for example,
American airlines to pick up and discharge passengers and cargo in London on a New
York-Paris service. The British feared that such a practice, without restrictions, would
facilitate American domination of the airways. FDR and Churchill became embroiled in
the fray, and their correspondence on the matter was as contentious as any in their long
relationship. FDR initially laid the onus for compromise on the British, but Churchill
insisted that they had already given much and that the U.S. demands were far more than
they were willing to grant. FDR then warned that if the British did not make concessions,
they might jeopardize Lend-Lease requests. Churchill sent another firm note in which he
pointed out that the British had placed themselves at a great disadvantage in the field by
opening their bases to American transports and by acceding to the Lyttleton Agreement.
Citing an American sense of “fair play:’ he argued that the British were simply not in a
position to compete with them, and thus strong-arm tactics were hardly fair.
The conflict would wane, though not because of any American sense of “fair play:’ As
the conference progressed, neither the British nor the Americans found much support for
their respective positions. The British had little success in rallying even their own
dominions. In turn, many conference attendees feared American inundation. To further
complicate matters, there were divisions in the U.S. ranks. Some members of the U.S.
delegation opposed Berle’s policy. They complained anonymously to the press that he
would “give away” international aviation to European competitors. The resulting articles
revealed the disarray in the U.S. ranks and hampered Berle in his dealings at the
conference. Then, in the midst of the conference, Hull resigned as Secretary of State, and
Edward Stettinius succeeded him. Berle immediately received a letter from FDR
expressing regret over the assistant secretary’s “resignation:’ This shocking incident
remains shrouded in mystery; Berle did not voluntarily “resign:’ Whatever the cause, this
development undermined him. The conference came to a close in December with little to
show for either side. There was no international mandate for the “open skies” program.
The nations did agree to form the International Civil Aviation Organization, but this had
no regulatory powers. There were agreements on technical matters, but the disputed
commercial issues remained unresolved. 45
As the war drew to a close, the two sides muddled on as best they could. The British
joined the International Air Transport Association [IATA] in April 1945. This organization
1 2 had the authority to set minimum rates and standards of service for international airlines.
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the IATA rate. The British realized that they needed to reach an agreement with the
Americans in order to prevent such unbridled competition. In turn, the Americans
realized that they needed to deal with the British, who were blocking U.S. airlines on many
world routes. The two sides ultimately reached a compromise at a meeting in Bermuda in
February 1946. The British granted American airlines the right to pick up and discharge
passengers at intermediate stops. In turn, the Americans recognized the IATA’s authority
to set international rates. 46 The two rivals had declared a truce in their air war.
The Bermuda agreement closed a key chapter in the Anglo-American commercial
aviation rivalry. While the two powers had muted this rivalry for the sake of Allied unity,
it had simmered beneath the surface, complicating their relationship and greatly affecting
the development ofinternational airlines. It left its mark, even though it was only a rivalry
of a kind.
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